Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong by Jerry A. Fodor
By Jerry A. Fodor
The popular thinker Jerry Fodor, a number one determine within the research of the brain for greater than 20 years, offers a strikingly unique concept at the easy ingredients of suggestion. He means that the guts of cognitive technology is its conception of strategies, and that cognitive scientists have long past badly unsuitable in lots of parts simply because their assumptions approximately options were fallacious. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic idea of recommendations, bargains out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and means that destiny paintings on human cognition may still construct upon new foundations.
This vigorous, conversational, and beautifully available e-book is the 1st quantity within the Oxford Cognitive technological know-how sequence, the place the simplest unique paintings during this box can be offered to a extensive readership. Concepts will fascinate an individual attracted to modern paintings on brain and language. Cognitive technological know-how seriously is not an analogous again.
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Extra info for Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
E. e. ’ Here I have followed what Pylyshyn and I (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988) called the ‘Classical’ computational tradition that proceeds from Turing: mental representations are syntactically structured. Their conditions of semantic evaluation and their causal powers both depend on their syntactic structures; the former because mental representations have a compositional semantics that is sensitive to the syntactic relations among their constituents; the latter because mental processes are computations and are thus syntactically driven by definition.
The central consideration will be this: If you wish to hold that the content of a concept is constituted by the inferences that it enters into, you are in need of a principled way of deciding which inferences constitute which concepts. What primarily distinguishes the cognitive theories we’ll consider is how they answer this question. My line will be that, though as far as anybody knows the answers they offer exhaust the options, pretty clearly none of them can be right. Not, NB, that they are incoherent, or otherwise confused; just that they fail to satisfy the empirical constraints on theories of concepts that I’ve been enumerating, and are thus, almost certainly, false.
On balance, I think we had better take it for granted, 2 It bears emphasis that systematicity concerns symmetries of cognitive capacities, not of actual mental states. It is, for example, patently not the case that whoever thinks that Mary loves John also thinks that John loves Mary. Compare van Gelder and Nicklasson 1994. Chaps. 1 & 2 11/3/97 1:13 PM Page 27 What Concepts Have To Be 27 and as part of what is not negotiable, that systematicity and productivity are grounded in the ‘architecture’ of mental representation and not in the vagaries of experience.